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DOMESTIC LAW
I. MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS ACCRUED DURING MARRIAGE ARE
SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
In Tiffault v. Tiffault' the South Carolina Supreme Court ac-
cepted Congress's eight-year-old invitation and held that vested mili-
tary retirement benefits are an earned property right and are subject to
equitable distribution. This decision brings military pensions within
the ambit of South Carolina's Equitable Apportionment of Marital
Property Act.2
The Tiffault decision is best understood when it is considered to-
gether with the state and federal law developments that led up to it. In
1981 the United States Supreme Court decided McCarty v. McCarty,
3
in which it held that the federal laws that govern military retirement
pay pre-empt state property laws and prohibit state courts from con-
sidering a military pension in a divorce-related division of property.
4
The Court left unresolved a split among the lower courts because it
declined to decide whether military retirement pay is compensation for
current services or deferred compensation. 5 In 1982 the South Carolina
Supreme Court decided the companion cases of Bugg v. Bugg6 and
Carter v. Carter.7 In Bugg the court held that in light of McCarty,
military retirement pay is not property that is subject to equitable dis-
tribution." In Carter the court, by analogy, extended the Bugg ration-
ale to civil service nondisability retirement pay although there was no
mandate to do so under McCarty.9
In 1983 Congress reacted to the McCarty decision and enacted the
1. 401 S.E.2d 157 (S.C. 1991).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-471 to -479 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
3. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
4. See id. at 236. As a result of its interpretation of the statute and reliance on
legislative history, the Court found that Congress intended that benefits be the sole
property of the recipient. Id. at 224-30.
5. See id. at 223 n.16.
6. 277 S.C. 270, 286 S.E.2d 135 (1982).
7. 277 S.C. 277, 286 S.E.2d 139 (1982).
8. Bugg, 277 S.C. at 274, 286 S.E.2d at 137. The court stated that it was proper to
consider military retirement pay when "determining whether alimony should be paid
and, if so, in setting the amount." Id.
9. Carter, 277 S.C. at 279, 286 S.E.2d at 140. In dicta the court stated that "con-
tributions to any pension fund.. . are generally not subject to equitable distribution."
Id. at 279 n.1, 286 S.E.2d at 140 n.1.
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Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act,10 which effec-
tively overruled McCarty. The Act provides, in part, that "a court may
treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member . . . ei-
ther as property solely of the member or as property of the member
and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such
court."1  In effect, Congress eliminated all notions of pre-emption and
left the issue to the states. The South Carolina Supreme Court then
decided Brown v. Brown,12 in which it recognized that Congress in-
tended that each state be allowed to choose whether or not military
retirement pay is property subject to apportionment. The Brown court
decided that military retirement benefits are income and not marital
property."3
The South Carolina Legislature subsequently enacted the Equita-
ble Apportionment of Marital Property Act (EAMPA), 4 which states
that "'marital property' . . .means all real and personal property
which has been acquired by the parties during the marriage and which
is owned as of the date of filing or commencement of marital litigation
... regardless of how legal title is held."1 ' However, the Act excepts
from judicial apportionment five specific types of property.
After enactment of EAMPA the court of appeals decided Martin
v. Martin.6 Martin held that the EAMPA definition of marital prop-
erty includes military retirement benefits. The court reasoned that be-
cause military retirement benefits were not specifically excluded in the
five specific clauses, such benefits must be included in the general defi-
nition.17 The court relied on its decision in Kneece v. Kneece,5 which
held that civil service pensions were "property" under EAMPA.'9
In Tiffault the supreme court relied on Martin and held that the
military pension at issue was subject to judicial apportionment. 20 The
supreme court held that EAMPA had no effect on Brown because that
opinion defined military pensions as income and not as real or personal
property.2' The court stated that there was no basis for the court of
10. Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions at 10 U.S.C.).
11. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1988).
12. 279 S.C. 116, 302 S.E.2d 860 (1983), overruled, Tiffault v. Tiffault, 401 S.E.2d
157 (S.C. 1991).
13. Id. at 118, 302 S.E.2d at 861.
14. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-471 to -479 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
15. Id. § 20-7-473.
16. 296 S.C. 436, 373 S.E.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1988).
17. Id. at 438-39, 373 S.E.2d at 707-08.
18. 296 S.C. 28, 370 S.E.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1988).
19. Id. at 33-34, 370 S.E.2d at 291-92.
20. Tiffault v. Tiffault, 401 S.E.2d 157, 158 (S.C. 1991).
21. Id. The supreme court did not answer the finding of the Kneece court that
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appeals distinction of Brown in Martin. The supreme court nonethe-
less affirmed the court of appeals and overruled Brown. The court con-
cluded that military retirement benefits are compensation for past ser-
vices 22 and held that "vested military retirement benefits constitute an
earned property right which, if accrued during the marriage, is subject
to equitable distribution."2
The court also implicitly rejected Carter's dicta.2' Kneece is there-
fore good law. The court reasoned that the economic reality is "that
military retirement benefits accrued during marriage constitute a joint
investment of both parties. Typically. . . a military spouse must move
from place to place and consequently forfeit a separate career or make
other outstanding contributions in support of the marriage."'2 5
Because the court's definition of pensions as marital property is
not based on interpretation of any particular statutory provision, there
is no rational basis for distinguishing between military and nonmilitary
spouses. The court's logic is not unique to military families. It remains
unclear, however, whether the nebulous distinction between property
and income still exists. The court raised the issue but relied on defini-
tions to decide the case. The distinction therefore may be available for
other uses.
Brian Murphy
II. VISITATION RIGHTS TO GRANDPARENTS DENIED ABSENT
ExCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
In Brown v. Earnhardt2s the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that grandparents are not entitled to autonomous visitation privileges
absent a showing of exceptional circumstances. Because the supreme
court discerned no exceptional circumstances in this case, it reversed
the court of appeals order,27 which granted the grandparents' petition
for visitation rights.2
"[flor classification purposes, most courts have found no meaningful distinction between
matured and unmatured retirement pensions. An overwhelming majority of the states
that have considered the issue have classified unmatured pensions as marital property."
Kneece, 296 S.C. at 33, 370 S.E.2d at 291 (citations omitted).
22. Tiffault, 401 S.E.2d at 158.
23. Id.
24. See supra note 9.
25. Tiffault, 401 S.E.2d at 158.
26. 396 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1990).
27. Id. at 360.
28. Brown v. Earnhardt, 297 S.C. 7, 374 S.E.2d 513 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 396
S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1990).
1991]
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The mother and father of the infant divorced in 1984. In the di-
vorce proceeding the family court granted the mother custody of the
child and granted the father visitation rights. The mother voluntarily
allowed the child to visit with the father's parents every other Thurs-
day night. When the mother ceased to allow these visitations, the fa-
ther and his parents brought suit seeking visitation rights for the pa-
ternal grandparents. The family court granted the grandparents'
petition and awarded the grandparents visitation rights for a twenty-
hour period once a month. The court of appeals upheld the family
court's order, and the mother appealed.
29
. A primary issue facing the supreme court was how broadly to in-
terpret its earlier decision in Chavis v. WittY' In Chavis the court up-
held an order granting the paternal grandparents visitation rights with
their granddaughter whose father had died. The mother's new husband
had adopted the child. The court held that the adoption did not cut off
the relationship between the grandparents and the child because the
deceased father had not consented to the adoption.321
The court of appeals read Chavis as holding that the award of visi-
tation rights to grandparents was within the sound discretion of the
family court and that the family court's power to award such rights
was not limited to situations in which the noncustodial parent was pre-
cluded from visitation.3 2 The supreme court disagreed with this broad
interpretation of Chavis.3 3 The court noted three features that distin-
guish Earnhardt from Chavis. First, the father in Earnhardt main-
tained strong ties with his daughter. Second, the father had liberal visi-
tation rights. Third, the grandparents customarily saw the child during
visits with her father.3'
The court quoted approvingly from a New Jersey case which
stated that "it would seldom, if ever, be in the best interests of the
child to grant visitation to the grandparents when their child, the par-
ent, has such rights. 35 Furthermore, the court found that the close
relationship between grandparents and grandchildren is not, by itself,
a sufficient justification for infringing upon the rights of the natural
parents." The court therefore held that because no exceptional cir-
cumstances existed in this case, the grandparents were not entitled to
29. Earnhardt, 396 S.E.2d at 359.
30. 285 S.C. 77, 328 S.E.2d 74 (1985).
31. Id. at 79, 328 S.E.2d at 75.
32. Earnhardt, 297 S.C. at 9, 374 S.E.2d at 514.
33. Earnhardt, 396 S.E.2d at 359.
34. Id. at 359-60.
35. In re Adoption of a Child by M., 140 N.J. Super. 91, 94, 355 A.2d 211, 213 (Ch.
Div. 1976).
36. Earnhardt, 396 S.E.2d at 360.
[Vol. 43
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visitation rights separate from the visitation rights of their son.3 7
Section 20-7-420(33) of the South Carolina Code 8 allows the fam-
ily court to grant visitation rights to grandparents. The provision is
worded more broadly than most state statutes that authorize this type
award.39 The South Carolina statute does not contain the express re-
quirement that the noncustodial parent must not be awarded or must
fail to exercise visitation rights before the grandparents may petition
for separate visitation.0 The Earnhardt court restricted, however, the
situations in which grandparental visitation awards are proper."1
By authorizing the family court to award grandparental visitation
rights, the General Assembly placed South Carolina in line with the
vast majority of other jurisdictions.,2 Earnhardt helps to define the
limits of discretion; grandparents must now show exceptional circum-
stances before they may benefit from this statute. The court held that
the grandparents failed to carry this burden and were not entitled to
visitation rights separate from those of their son, the father. 3
The concern for subjecting a child to competing visitation obliga-
tions seems justified. When too many parties compete for a child's
company, the child's life can become confused and overburdened. 44 Al-
37. Id. In addition, the court found that the award of visitation rights to the grand-
parents, together with the father's visitation rights would "border[] on divided custody
among the contending parties" because the custodial parent would have the child only
one full weekend a month. Id. The court noted that it disfavors divided custody. Id.
(quoting Avin v. Avin, 272 S.C. 514, 515, 252 S.E.2d 888, 889 (1979) (per curiam)).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op. 1976). This section states, "The
family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... [t]o order periods of visitation for the
grandparents of the child." Id.
39. See Ingulli, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Social Policies and Legal Rights,
87 W. VA. L. Rv. 295, 307 (1985).
40. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (granting court
broad discretion to award visitation rights to grandparents) with W. VA. CODE § 48-2-
15(b)(1) (1986) (authorizing court upon an order of annulment, divorce, or decree of sep-
arate maintenance to grant visitation rights to grandparents when grandparents' child
cannot be located or fails to answer or appear and defend the cause of action).
41. Ingulli explains this judicial response by noting that it is faithful to "the gen-
eral rule of construction that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be nar-
rowly construed." Ingulli, supra note 39, at 303 n.50. Under the common law grandpar-
ents had no legal right to visit their grandchildren. Annotation, Grandparents'
Visitation Rights, 90 AL.R3D 222, 225 (1979). Even the common law, however, some-
times recognized special circumstances in which grandparents could be awarded visita-
tion. See, e.g., Douglass v. Merriman, 163 S.C. 210, 213, 161 S.E. 452, 453 (1931) (grant-
ing maternal grandparents visitation rights when the mother was deceased and the child
had been living with the grandparents before custody was transferred to the father).
42. See Ingulli, supra note 39, at 295.
43. Brown v. Earnhardt, 396 S.E.2d 358, 360 (S.C. 1990).
44. "'[Vlisitation by grandparents should be derivative; otherwise the child might
have four, or even six people competing for his company- father, mother, paternal grand-
1991]
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though the relationship between grandparents and grandchildren can
be a most sacred one, the court is correct in leaving these decisions,
absent some exceptional circumstances, to the families themselves.
MacLean Limehouse
III. AcCUSED SPOUSE IN ADULTERY CASE BEARS BURDEN OF PROVING
INSANITY
In Rutherford v. Rutherford45 the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals held that a multiple personality disorder does not excuse a
spouse for adulterous acts unless the adulterous spouse shows that a
disengaged alter ego committed the acts.46 In its order denying the
adulterous spouse's petition for rehearing, the court held that the adul-
terous spouse must "prove that her mental condition deprived her of
the ability to control her various personalities by a preponderance of
the evidence.'
4
7
Bobby E. Rutherford and Carol Rutherford married on September
10, 1982. In July 1988 Carol learned of her multiple personalities when
she was diagnosed as suffering from manic depression, schizophrenia,
and nymphomania. Carol testified that after being diagnosed, she stud-
ied schizophrenia and tried to hide the other personalities. Bobby tes-
tified that when Carol was in Charter Rivers Hospital in September
1988, she received flowers from Claude Tedder, another patient. On
September 13, 1988, the hospital discharged Carol. On September 17,
1988, Bobby went to a trailer park where Carol told him she would be
spending the night with a girlfriend. He saw Carol park her car and go
into Tedder's trailer. No one exited the trailer for at least fifteen
hours.
4
Bobby brought this action for a divorce on the grounds of adultery
and for a denial of alimony to Carol. The family court denied Bobby a
divorce and granted Carol four hundred dollars per month in alimony.
parents and maternal grandparents."' Id. (alteration by court) (quoting In re Adoption
of a Child by M., 140 N.J. Super. 91, 94, 355 A.2d 211, 213 (Ch. Div. 1976)).
45. 401 S.E.2d 177 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
46. Id. at 181.
47. Id. at 182. The court initially ruled that to satisfy this burden of proof the
adulterous spouse must "show by clear evidence that her mental condition deprived her
of the ability to control the various personalities that she found herself in." Id. (empha-
sis added).
48. Id. at 179. Additional circumstantial evidence also existed of adultery. Bobby
found Tedder's name, address, and phone number in Carol's makeup kit, and a detective
had evidence that Carol had been at Tedder's trailer on several occasions.
[Vol. 43
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Bobby appealed.'
The court of appeals reversed. The court noted that Bobby had
shown that Carol committed adultery with Tedder.50 The court ex-
plained that in divorce actions which involve spouses suffering from
mental abnormalities, courts are obligated to "protect[] helpless and
blameless spouses."5 Because the court was concerned that the trial
court's ruling would encourage promiscuity, however, it declared that
Carol was obligated to show that her mental condition deprived her of
the ability to control her personalities.2 Because Carol did not meet
this burden, the court found that she was not the type of helpless and
blameless spouse who needed judicial protection.
5 3
Adultery may be defined as "[v]oluntary sexual intercourse of a
married person with a person other than the offender's husband or
wife, or by a person with a person who is married to another."54 In
South Carolina adultery is a basis for divorce.5 5 The statute that gov-
erned the relationship between adultery and alimony when Bobby
brought this action stated, "No alimony shall be granted an adulterous
spouse." 6
A spouse that seeks a divorce on the ground of adultery must es-
tablish by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the other spouse
committed adultery.57 Because of "the clandestine nature of the of-
fense, it is rarely possible to obtain evidence of the commission of the
act by the testimony of eyewitnesses."58 Therefore, a spouse may prove
adultery by direct evidence, by circumstantial evidence, or by a combi-
nation of the two. 59 Nevertheless, "[t]he proof must be sufficiently defi-
49. Id. at 178.
50. Id. at 181.
51. Id. at 182 (citing Shaw v. Shaw, 256 S.C. 453, 182 S.E.2d 865 (1971)).
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990).
55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
56. Id. § 20-3-130. The relevant portion of section 20-3-130, as amended by the
General Assembly (effective November 29, 1990), now reads:
No alimony may be awarded a spouse who commits adultery before the earliest
of these two events: (1) the formal signing of a written property or marital
settlement agreement or (2) entry of a permanent order of separate mainte-
nance and support or of a permanent order approving a property or marital
settlement agreement between the parties.
Id. § 20-3-130(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
57. Odom v. Odom, 248 S.C. 144, 146, 149 S.E.2d 353, 354 (1966); Watson v. Wat-
son, 291 S.C. 13, 25, 351 S.E.2d 883, 890 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Calcutt v. Calcutt, 282
S.C. 565, 320 S.E.2d 55 (Ct. App. 1984)).
58. Fulton v. Fulton, 293 S.C. 146, 147, 359 S.E.2d 88, 88 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing
Loftis v. Loftis, 284 S.C. 216, 325 S.E.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1985)).
59. Anders v. Anders, 285 S.C. 512, 515, 331 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1985) (per curiam).
1991]
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nite to identify the time and place of the offense, and the circum-
stances under which it was committed."60 If the proof of adultery is
inconclusive, then a court should deny the petition for a divorce on the
ground of adultery."'
Rutherford departs from the principle that if evidence of adultery
is inconclusive, a divorce on this ground should be denied. The court
concluded that Bobby had shown by circumstantial evidence that
Carol's body committed adultery with Tedder.6' Normally, this evi-
dence is sufficient to grant a divorce on the ground of adultery. In this
case, however, the question remained as to whether Carol committed
the act "as a cognitive person [rather than] as a disengaged alter
ego."63 Even though Bobby proved by clear evidence that Carol's body
had sexual intercourse with Tedder, he did not prove by clear evidence
that Carol committed the act as a cognitive person. Therefore, the fam-
ily court properly denied Bobby's petition.
In an unprecedented move the court of appeals shifted the burden
of proof to Carol to show that she should be excused from responsibil-
ity. 4 The Rutherford court required Carol to establish-initially by
clear evidence but modified to a preponderance of the evidence-that
"one of her uncontrollable personalities committed the act."6 5 Carol
was unable to meet this burden.
The court decided that to rule otherwise "would tend to encourage
promiscuity and relax conduct relative to other fault grounds for di-
vorce where there is the presence of some mental abnormality. Such a
proposition would distort the intent of our Supreme Court in Shaw of
protecting helpless and blameless spouses." ' However, the policy ra-
tionale of Shaw was not only to protect the helpless, blameless, and
mentally incapacitated wife, but also to promote the strong public pol-
icy in this state of fostering and protecting the institution of mar-
60. Odom, 248 S.C. at 146, 149 S.E.2d at 354; accord Watson, 291 S.C. at 25, 351
S.E.2d at 890.
61. Rabon v. Rabon, 289 S.C. 49, 53, 344 S.E.2d 615, 617 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing
Lee v. Lee, 237 S.C. 532, 118 S.E.2d 171 (1961)); see also Fulton, 293 S.C. at 147, 359
S.E.2d at 88 ("Circum stantial proof of adultery must be so convincing as to exclude any
other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt.") (citing Hayes v. Hayes, 225 La. 374, 73
So. 2d 179 (1954)).
62. Rutherford v. Rutherford, 401 S.E.2d 177, 181 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
63. Id. at 179.
64. Id. at 181. This burden shift is consistent with the approach long used in crimi-
nal cases in which the defendant pleads insanity as a defense. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-
24-10(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) ("The defendant has the burden of proving the de-
fense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence."). The Rutherford court never
announced, however, that it was relying on this criminal law analogy.
65. Rutherford, 401 S.E.2d at 181.
66. Id. at 182.
[Vol. 43
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riage . 7 In shifting the burden of proof, the Rutherford court risks not
only harm to the potentially helpless and blameless spouse, but it also
risks erosion of the strong public policy in South Carolina favoring
marriage over divorce. Previously, if the spouse that sought a divorce
on the ground of adultery was unable to prove adultery, the divorce
would automatically be denied. Now, once the spouse proves adulter-
ous acts the spouse accused of adultery must prove that he or she did
not commit the act as a cognitive person. The Rutherford approach
facilitates divorce from a spouse suffering from a mental abnormality.
The court of appeals used unprecedented means in granting a pe-
tition for divorce on the ground of adultery. By shifting the burden of
proof to the mentally ill spouse to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the spouse did not commit the adulterous act as a cogni-
tive person, the court appears to be following the South Carolina crimi-
nal law standard for insanity cases. If the court had left the burden of
proof where precedent suggests that it should be, on the spouse seeking
a divorce, then the court would have reached a contrary result because
the husband did not prove by clear evidence that the wife as a cogni-
tive person committed adultery.
Elizabeth T. Krawcheck
IV. GRANT OF DrVORCE TO BOTH PARTIEs IN NO-FAULT MARRIAGE
DISSOLUTION UPHELD
In Miles v. Miles6" the South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a
family court's grant of a divorce to both a wife who sought a divorce on
the grounds of a one-year continuous separation and a husband who
counterclaimed for the same relief on the same grounds. The decision
ultimately rested on the principle that "'whatever doesn't make any
difference, doesn't matter.' ,9
Mrs. Miles brought an action seeking a divorce on the grounds of a
one-year continuous separation. Her husband answered and counter-
claimed for divorce on the same grounds. Mr. and Mrs. Miles lived
apart for one year prior to the instigation of this suit. Neither party
presented any evidence of extenuating circumstances. The family court
67. Shaw v. Shaw, 256 S.C. 453, 455, 182 S.E.2d 865, 865 (1971) (citing Brown v.
Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330 (1949)); cf. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)
(stating that marriage "is the foundation of the family and of society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress").
68. 397 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
69. Id. at 792 (quoting McCall v. Finley, 294 S.C. 1, 4, 362 S.E.2d 26, 28 (Ct. App.
1987)).
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granted a divorce to both parties. Mrs. Miles appealed and contended
that the court should have granted the divorce only to her.70 The sole
question before the court of appeals was whether the family court may
grant a divorce to both parties when the only grounds for divorce are
that the husband and wife have lived separate and apart without co-
habitation for one year.
7 1
The Miles court first focused on the statute that provides the
grounds for divorce in South Carolina. Section 20-3-10(5) allows a
grant of divorce "[o]n the application of either party if and when the
husband and wife have lived separate and apart without cohabitation
for a period of one year."72 In resolving the question presented on ap-
peal, the Miles court paid particular attention to the word either con-
tained in the statute.
Because no South Carolina court had interpreted the word either
in this statute, the court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance.73
The court also examined a dictionary, which first defined either "as
'being the one and the other of two.'" The court adopted the "one
and the other" definition and determined that the statute, so con-
strued, did not prohibit granting dual divorces.
7 5
The court next discussed the policy grounds for the decision. The
Miles court noted that the tendency of many individuals to think of a
divorce as "a prize given in recognition of a victory in a contest" or as
something to be "awarded" is inconsistent with the notion of a no-fault
divorce.76 The court distinguished between divorces granted on fault-
based grounds and divorces granted on no-fault grounds.77 In the prior
category South Carolina courts grant the divorce solely to the injured
spouse, and certain important repercussions follow. 78 On the other
70. Id. at 790.
71. Id.
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10(5) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
73. Miles, 397 S.E.2d at 790-91.
74. Id. at 791 (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NE W COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 399 (9th ed.
1983)). Mrs. Miles urged the court to accept the second-listed definition, which defined
either as "'being the one or the other of two.'" Id. (quoting WEBsTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 399 (9th ed. 1983)); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 516 (6th ed.
1990) (defining either as "[e]ach of two; the one and the other; one or the other of two
alternatives; one of two"). But see BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (3d ed. 1969) (de-
fining either as "[p]referably, one or the other of two").
75. Miles, 397 S.E.2d at 790.
76. Id. at 791.
77. Id. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10(1)-(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (authorizing
divorce for adultery, desertion for a period of one year, physical cruelty, and habitual
drunkenness, respectively) with id. § 20-3-10(5) (authorizing divorce "when the husband
and wife have lived separate and apart without cohabitation for a period of one year").
78. Miles, 397 S.E.2d at 791-92; see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130(A) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1990) (establishing situations in which adulterous spouse is ineligible to receive
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hand, a no-fault divorce is a "recognition of a state of affairs existing
between the parties, not as the result of some wrongdoing by a party.
There is no reason to imply that one party is entitled to the divorce to
the exclusion of the other.1
7 9
Cases may arise in which a court's grant of dual divorces is not
equitable. The court implicitly recognized this point when it noted
Mrs. Miles had not shown that the court's ruling prejudiced her in any
way."' Other situations may be distinguishable on their facts. The stat-
ute recognizes this contingency by allowing a divorce to be granted
"upon one or more of the [enumerated] grounds." 81
The Miles decision causes one to wonder whether family courts in
this state might be willing to grant parties separate divorces on incon-
sistent grounds, rather than on the single no-fault ground presented in
this case. At this time, there is no indication that this will come to
pass. 2 Nevertheless, allowing separate divorces on divergent grounds
may be the logical extension of the ruling in this case.
Lara A. Degenhart
V. CONDUCT CONSTITUTING ADULTERY AND SCOPE OF EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION ADDRESSED
In Panhorst v. Panhorst83 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that the exclusion of a wife's testimony that concerned her par-
amour's alleged impotence did not prejudicially affect the family
court's finding that the wife committed adultery.84 The decision argua-
bly extends the common-law definition of adultery" to include situa-
alimony).
79. Miles, 397 S.E.2d at 791 (footnote omitted).
80. Id.
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
82. In Smith v. Smith, 294 S.C. 194, 363 S.E.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1987), the family
court granted the wife a divorce on the grounds of one-year separation and refused to
consider the husband's counterclaim for a divorce on the grounds of adultery. The court
of appeals found that because the granting of a divorce on the grounds of adultery does
not dissolve the marriage any more completely than a divorce granted on the grounds of
one-year separation, the family court justifiably refused to consider the husband's coun-
terclaim. Id. at 197, 363 S.E.2d at 406.
83. 301 S.C. 100, 390 S.E.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1990).
84. Id. at 103, 390 S.E.2d at 378.
85. Id. ("At common law, adultery is the illicit intercourse of two persons, one of
whom, at least, is married.") (citing Hull v. Hull, 21 S.C. Eq. (2 Strob. Eq.) 174, 187
(1848)). The civil adultery at issue in Panhorst is distinguishable from criminal adultery.
Although civil adultery is a statutory basis for divorce in South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-3-10(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976), it is not statutorily defined. Criminal adultery, id. § 16-
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tions in which the alleged indiscretion involves physical intimacies
other than sexual intercourse. On a question of first impression, the
court also held that absent evidence that gifts of marital property by
one marital partner to a third party were made in contemplation of
divorce or with the intent of defrauding the other partner out of an
equitable distribution of the marital assets, the property is not a part
of the marital estate.86
Mrs. Panhorst appealed an order that granted her husband a di-
vorce on the grounds of adultery. She admitted that on numerous occa-
sions she had shared hotel rooms with her alleged paramour, Lasater,
but contended that she had not had sexual intercourse with him be-
cause he was impotent. Therefore, she argued, she could not have com-
mitted adultery. The family court judge excluded Mrs. Panhorst's tes-
timony about Lasater's impotency and found that she did not possess
the requisite medical expertise necessary to render an opinion on the
subject. Mrs. Panhorst appealed the exclusion on the theory that she
"'had special knowledge and first hand experience, which made her
competent to give her nonexpert opinion.' 1)87
The court of appeals found that the exclusion of Mrs. Panhorst's
testimony about Lasater's impotency was harmless error.8 8 The court
noted the extensive amount of circumstantial evidence which suggested
that Mrs. Panhorst had been sexually involved with Lasater8 9 Mrs.
Panhorst argued that her paramour's, impotence sufficiently rebutted
the inference of adultery raised by this evidence. The court concluded
that Mrs. Panhorst based her argument "on the unstated assumption
that sexual intercourse consists solely of the normal act of consumma-
tion between a man and a woman." 90 Although the court declined to
establish clear guidelines for determining which specific sexual acts
constitute adultery, it implied that actual consummation is
unnecessary.9 1
Under South Carolina law proof of adultery "'must be clear and
positive, and the infidelity must be established by a clear preponder-
15-60, is statutorily defined. See id. § 16-15-70. The-definition provided in section 16-15-
70 is not helpful in divorce actions because civil adultery is broader than criminal adul-
tery. Panhorst, 301 S.C. at 103 n.3, 390 S.E.2d at 378 n.3; see Doe v. Doe, 286 S.C. 507,
509 n.2, 334 S.E.2d 829, 831 n.2 (Ct. App. 1985).
86. Panhorst, 301 S.C. at 104-05, 390 S.E.2d at 378-79.
87. Id. at 102-03, 390 S.E.2d at 377-78 (quoting Brief of Appellant at 10).
88. Id. at 103, 390 S.E.2d at 378. The court chose not to speculate on how Mrs.
Panhorst obtained her information and opted to "leave it to the reader to consider how
she acquired her 'special knowledge and first hand experience' of Lasater's lack of sexual
prowess." Id. at 102 n.1, 390 S.E.2d at 378 n.1.
89. Id. at 102, 390 S.E.2d at 377.
90. Id. at 104, 390 S.E.2d at 378.
91. Id.
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ance of the evidence. The proof must be sufficiently definite to identify
the time and place of the offense, and the circumstances under which it
was committed.' "92 Because of the private nature of the offense, cir-
cumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish adultery.9 3 However, evi-
dence that places a spouse and third party together, without more,
does not warrant a finding of adultery." When the spouse that seeks to
prove adultery presents proof that the other spouse and the third party
are both disposed to commit adultery and the opportunity existed for
them to satisfy their inclinations, South Carolina law permits a finding
of adultery.
95
A spouse that attempts to prove adultery must present two kinds
of evidence to establish a prima facie case. First, the spouse and the
third party must have the opportunity to commit an adulterous act.
Exactly what constitutes "opportunity" is unclear, but hotel rooms and
business trips are classic examples.98 Second, evidence of inclination to
commit adultery must exist. Inclination may be shown by offering tes-
timony of prior instances of adultery, thus establishing predisposition
towards the offense.9 In the alternative, "[t]he same evidence which
proves the opportunity can also prove the disposition. For example,
where a married man is observed going upstairs in a bawdyhouse, un-
less something to the contrary appears, no other evidence is required to
warrant a finding of adultery."'98
Although, on one level, Panhorst merely reinforces an established
body of law, the court's treatment of Mrs. Panhorst's impotency argu-
ment might herald the beginning of a period in South Carolina in
which the parameters of the definition of adultery are tested. The
court's holding makes possible, as in this case, a finding of adultery
even when impotency or some other physical impairment makes "the
92. McLaurin v. McLaurin, 294 S.C. 132, 133, 363 S.E.2d 110, 111 (Ct. App. 1987)
(quoting Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 512-13, 56 S.E.2d 330, 335 (1949)).
93. Odom v. Odom, 248 S.C. 144, 146, 149 S.E.2d 353, 354 (1966) (citing Brown v.
Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330 (1949)); Loftis v. Loftis, 284 S.C. 216, 218, 325 S.E.2d
73, 74 (Ct. App. 1985).
94. Fox v. Fox, 277 S.C. 400, 402, 288 S.E.2d 390, 391 (1982); Hartley v. Hartley,
292 S.C. 245, 246-47, 355 S.E.2d 869, 871 (Ct. App. 1987).
95. Hartley, 292 S.C. at 247, 355 S.E.2d at 871 (citing 27A CJ.S. Divorce §§ 166,
193(b) (1986)).
96. See Husband v. Wife, 301 S.C. 531, 392 S.E.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1990) (hotel
rooms); see also Hartley v. Hartley, 292 S.C. 245, 355 S.E.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1987) (Myrtle
Beach apartment). But see Fox v. Fox, 277 S.C. 400, 288 S.E.2d 390 (1982) (reversing
finding of adultery in case in which spouse and alleged paramour were together in par-
amour's home and spouse's relatives' homes).
97. See Hartley, 292 S.C. at 247, 355 S.E.2d at 871.
98. Prevatte v. Prevatte, 297 S.C. 345, 351, 377 S.E.2d 114, 118 (Ct. App. 1989).
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normal act of consummation between a man and a woman"0 9 impossi-
ble. The Panhorst court never considered whether Mrs. Panhorst had
proved her knowledge of her paramour's condition. The court con-
cluded that her attempt to establish her expertise was sufficient to
warrant a finding of adultery. 100
Mrs. Panhorst also challenged the equitable distribution to which
the family court determined she was entitled upon the dissolution of
her marriage. She stated that during their marriage her husband had
given approximately $25,000 to his mother without her knowledge or
consent and implied that such one-sided use of marital funds was suffi-
ciently improper to warrant equitable relief. She further contended
that the family court should have treated the value of the gifts as mari-
tal property that is subject to equitable division.110
Equitable division of marital assets is governed by statute. 02
Under the statute only property acquired by spouses during the course
of their marriage and owned by them at the end of their marriage is
distributable marital property.'0 ' The court found that at the time the
Panhorst litigation commenced, the money that Mr. Panhorst gave to
his mother was not in the marital estate and therefore was not subject
to equitable distribution.10 4 As a practical matter, the court reached
the only possible conclusion. If the court had ruled otherwise, Mr.
Panhorst would have been required to reimburse the marital estate for
the yearly allowance he sent to his mother.
In its opinion the court relied primarily on the obvious intent of
the legislature to fix a date on which to identify distributable marital
assets. The court stated that "[tihe statute wisely prevents the other
spouse from resurrecting [one-sided] transactions at the end of the
marriage to gain an advantage in the equitable distribution. Were it to
do otherwise, human greed and vindictiveness would transform the
courts into 'auditing agencies for every marriage that falters.' ,'5
The court also relied on the lack of evidence that the gifts were
made either "in contemplation of divorce or with intent to deprive
[Mrs. Panhorst] of her right to equitable distibution.' ' 0e Although
99. Panhorst v. Panhorst, 301 S.C. 100, 104, 390 S.E.2d 376, 378 (Ct. App. 1990).
100. Id. This conclusion leaves open the question of whether a husband could use
impotency as an affirmative defense in an adultery suit brought by his wife. Although the
Panhorst ruling suggests that the defense is not viable, the cases are distinguishable.
101. Id., 390 S.E.2d at 378-79.
102. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-7-473 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
103. Id.
104. Panhorst, 301 S.C. at 105-06, 390 S.E.2d at 379.
105. Id. at 105, 390 S.E.2d at 379 (quoting In re Marriage of Getautas, 189 IlM. App.
3d 148, 154, 544 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (1989)).
106. Id. at 105-06, 390 S.E.2d at 379.
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payments made with improper motives might present a different ques-
tion, the court found that, in the absence of fraudulent intent, spouses
are not prohibited from making outright gifts of marital property to
third parties.107
The Panhorst decision is likely to have little effect on South Caro-
lina law. South Carolina judges are unlikely to invoke the Panhorst
court's broadened definition of adultery and probably will continue to
resolve adultery issues on the basis of whether it appears that a spouse
had sexual intercourse with a third party.108 Moreover, despite the
novel issue presented by Mrs. Panhorst's equitable distribution claims,
the stringent requirements imposed on challenges to conveyances of
marital property make it improbable that this issue will be raised in
the future.
Lara A. Degenhart
VI. APPELLATE DIVISION OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT REJECTS
CLAIM OF COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE BASED ON SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
"[A] common-law marriage may be defined as a nonceremonial or
informal marriage by agreement, entered into by a man and woman
having capacity to marry, ordinarily without compliance with such
statutory formalities as those pertaining to marriage licenses." 109 Com-
mon-law marriage is valid in South Carolina.110 In Jennings v. Hurt'"
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court applied South
Carolina law to determine that a common-law marriage did not exist
between Sandra Jennings and William McChord Hurt.
112
After meeting in 1981 Sandra Jennings and William Hurt began
living together in New York City. The two moved to South Carolina,
where they lived from October 31, 1982, until January 10, 1983. In 1982
Jennings became pregnant with Hurt's child. Hurt, who at the time
107. Id. at 106, 390 S.E.2d at 379.
108. Three months after Panhorst, the court of appeals restated that "'[a]dultery
may be proven by circumstantial evidence showing inclination and opportunity to com-
mit adultery."' Husband v. Wife, 301 S.C. 531, 533 n.6, 392 S.E.2d 811, 812 n.6 (Ct. App.
1990) (quoting Panhorst, 301 S.C. at 102, 390 S.E.2d at 377). This statement of the rule
did not expand the traditional rule in South Carolina.
109. 52 AM. Jup. 2D Marriage § 42 (1970) (footnote omitted).
110. Ex parte Blizzard, 185 S.C. 131, 193 S.E. 633 (1937) (adopting order of court of
common pleas).
111. 160 A.D.2d 576, 554 N.Y.S.2d 220 (mem.), appeal dismissed, 76 N.Y.2d 870,
561 N.E.2d 884, 560 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1990), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 804, 569 N.E.2d
1026, 568 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1991).
112. Id. at 578, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
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was married to another woman, commenced divorce proceedings. The
divorce became final on December 3, 1982. Jennings alleged that imme-
diately following Hurt's divorce, Hurt told her that he considered Jen-
nings and himself married, that they had a "spiritual marriage," and
that they "were more married than married people." '11 In 1983 Hurt
filed an affidavit with the Putative Fathers' Registry in New York to
acknowledge his paternity of Jennings's son. Jennings brought this ac-
tion to establish that she was Hurt's common-law wife based on the
couple's cohabitation in South Carolina. The New York County Su-
preme Court entered judgment for Hurt.""' Jennings appealed. The
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed and held
that the parties did not have a common-law marriage.15
To support its conclusion, the Jennings court looked to the record
and to South Carolina decisions. The court noted that Jennings "never
mentioned the conversation regarding the 'spiritual marriage' at her
deposition.' 1 6 Additionally, if the parties were married, it would have
been unnecessary for Hurt to file an affidavit with the Putative Fa-
thers' Registry to insure the legitimacy of Jennings's child." 7 Further-
more, in 1984, one year after leaving South Carolina, "drafts of a rela-
tionship agreement continued to state 'whether or not the parties
hereafter marry each other.' "118 The numerous affidavits and witnesses
persuaded the court that the parties did not hold themselves out as
married "nor were they perceived as husband and wife."" 9
The court relied on Ex parte Blizzard"20 when it stated the re-
quirements for a common-law marriage in South Carolina. "[T]he pro-
ponent must establish 'an intention on the part of both parties to enter
into a marriage contract.' ",121 The court also relied on a Connecticut
case which applied South Carolina law to emphasize that the mutual
agreement necessary to create a common-law marriage must be demon-
strated with such intent and "'clarity on the part of the parties that
marriage does not creep up on either of them and catch them una-
wares. One cannot be married unwittingly or accidentally.' ",122 The
113. Id. at 577, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
114. Id. at 576-77, 554 N.Y.S.2d 220-21.
115. Id. at 578, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
116. Id. at 577, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 185 S.C. 131, 193 S.E. 633 (1937) (adopting order of court of common pleas).
121. Jennings, 160 A.D.2d at 577, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (quoting Ex parte Blizzard,
185 S.C. at 133, 193 S.E. at 634 (order of common pleas court)).
122. Id. at 577-78, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (quoting Collier v. City of Milford, 206 Conn.
242, 251, 537 A.2d 474, 479 (1988)).
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Jennings court found neither mutual intent nor an agreement to enter
into a marriage contract and, thus, no valid common-law marriage.
123
In holding against a common-law marriage, the court oversimpli-
fied the state of common-law marriage in South Carolina. "A basic re-
quirement of common-law marriage... is that the parties be compe-
tent to enter the marital state.' 12 ' Once the impediment to marriage is
removed, the parties' illicit relationship does not automatically convert
to a common-law marriage. 5 The parties must then reach "a new mu-
tual agreement either by way of civil ceremony or by way of recogni-
tion of the illicit relation and a new agreement to enter into a common-
law marriage."'
2 6
In Jennings Hurt's prior marriage was a barrier to his marrying
Jennings. The court recognized that Hurt was married until December
3, 1982, but did not discuss the effects of this marriage on Jennings's
common-law marriage claim. Hurt could not possibly have married
Jennings until his divorce with Hurt was complete.
"It is essential to a common law marriage that there shall be a
mutual agreement between the parties to assume toward each other
the relation of husband and wife."' 2 7 "A formal declaration of intent to
enter a common law marriage is not required ."2 If no formal declara-
tion of intent is present, the court can adduce the agreement either
from the surrounding circumstances" 29 or from the conduct of the par-
ties. 3 0 In Kirby v. Kirby'3' the South Carolina Supreme Court found
that the parties' consistent representation of themselves as husband
and wife in their community was a circumstance that could establish a
common-law marriage absent a formal declaration."'1 If a formal agree-
ment is not found, proof of cohabitation and reputation constitute "ev-
123. Id. at 578, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
124. 52 AM. Jui. 2d Marriage § 47 (1970) (footnote omitted). If one of the parties is
already married, the married party is incompetent to enter a common-law marriage. See,
e.g., Kirby v. Kirby, 270 S.C. 137, 141, 241 S.E.2d 415, 416 (1978).
125. Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 280 S.C 546, 551, 314 S.E.2d 16, 19 (Ct. App. 1984).
126. Kirby, 270 S.C. at 141, 241 S.E.2d at 416 (citing Byers v. Mount Vernon Mills,
Inc., 268 S.C. 68, 231 S.E.2d 699 (1977)); see also Tedder v. Tedder, 108 S.C. 271, 279, 94
S.E. 19, 21 (1917) (stating that "[c]ohabitation, begun and continued immorally, does not
ripen into marriage by the mere lapse of time, like a trespass long continued may ripen
into a right of possession"),
127. Johnson v. Johnson, 235 S.C. 542, 550, 112 S.E.2d 647, 651 (1960).
128. Day v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 519 F. Supp. 872, 877 (D.S.C.
1981) (citing Kirby, 270 S.C. at 140, 241 S.E.2d at 416).
129. Id. (citing Kirby, 270 S.C. at 140, 241 S.E.2d at 416).
130. Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 280 S.C. 546, 551, 314 S.E.2d 16, 19 (Ct. App. 1984)
(citing Byers v. Mount Vernon Mills, Inc., 268 S.C. 68, 231 S.E.2d 699 (1977)).
131. 270 S.C. 137, 241 S.E.2d 415 (1978).
132. Id. at 141, 241 S.E.2d at 417.
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idential matters which, if strong enough, may establish the agreement
between the parties to marry without any direct proof of such
agreement." '13
Accordingly, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court first should have looked at the intent of the parties and then at
the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties to deter-
mine whether Jennings and Hurt had a common-law marriage. The
New York court flip-flopped this analysis. The court first examined the
surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties. It deter-
mined that "the parties never held themselves out as being married
nor were they perceived as husband and wife."' 184 The court then went
on to discuss the necessary intent for common-law marriage in South
Carolina. The court cited Ex parte Blizzard for the principle that the
proponent in a common-law marriage case in South Carolina "must es-
tablish 'an intention on the part of both parties to enter into a mar-
riage contract.' ,,13 The court quoted Collier v. City of Milford,"" to
emphasize that common-law marriage should not "'creep up on either
[party] and catch them unawares.' "3
In reaching its decision that no valid common-law marriage ex-
isted between Sandra Jennings and William Hurt, the Appellate Divi-
sion of the New York Supreme Court gave an unrevealing and incon-
clusive analysis of common-law marriage in South Carolina. The court
did not discuss the effect of Hurt's previous marriage on Jennings's
common-law marriage claim. Further, the court reversed the analysis
South Carolina courts follow in determining whether a common-law
marriage exists. If, however, the court had applied the correct reason-
ing, the court likely would have reached the same result because no
evidence of Hurt's intent to marry Jennings existed. Such intent is an
absolute requirement for common-law marriage in South Carolina. 3 8
Elizabeth T. Krawcheck
133. 52 AM. JuR. 2D Marriage § 44 (1970) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 235 S.C. 542,
112 S.E.2d 647 (1960)). Cohabitation and reputation are not essential to a common-law
marriage. See id.
134. Jennings v. Hurt, 160 A.D.2d 576, 577, 554 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (mem.), appeal
dismissed, 76 N.Y.2d 870, 561 N.E.2d 884, 560 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1990), apl6eal denied, 77
N.Y.2d 804, 569 N.E.2d 1026, 568 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1991).
135. Id. (quoting Ex parte Blizzard, 185 S.C. 131, 133, 193 S.E. 633, 634 (1937)).
136. 206 Conn. 242, 537 A.2d 474 (1988).
137. Jennings, 160 A.D.2d at 577, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (quoting Collier, 206 Conn.
at 251, 537 A.2d at 479).
138. See, e.g., Tedder v. Tedder, 108 S.C. 271, 276, 94 S.E. 19, 20 (1917).
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